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Abstract: 
Since World War II, direct stock ownership by households has largely been replaced by 
indirect stock ownership by financial institutions. We argue that tax policy is the driving 
force. Using long time-series from eight countries, we show that the fraction of household 
ownership decreases with measures of the tax benefits of holding stocks inside a pension plan. 
This finding is important for policy considerations on effective taxation and for financial 
economics research on the long-term effects of taxation on corporate finance and asset prices. 
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More than $100 billion a year is contributed to tax-deferred private pension plans in the United
States. Cash °ows of this magnitude ought to leave a visible trace in the economy. In this paper,
we investigate how the taxation of private pensions has shaped the ownership structure of the
stock market. At the end of World War II, households own most stocks directly. Sixty years later,
the fraction of household ownership has decreased to 30 percent. Households' ownership shares
have largely migrated to private pension plans managed by pension funds, mutual funds, and life
insurance companies.
Private pensions are favorably taxed. Employers and employees can contribute pre-tax dollars
for retirement purposes and investment returns grow tax free inside a pension plan. Shifting pre-
tax income from high-income work years to low-income retirement years reduces tax liability in a
progressive tax system. In the tax environment right before the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA
1986), when e®ective tax rates and tax progressivity were considerably higher than today. Ippolito
(1986) estimates as much as a 40 percent reduction in lifetime tax liability from optimal pension
use, about equally divided between tax-free returns and the tax bene¯t of income smoothing.
Such large potential tax savings hardly go unnoticed by labor market participants. We picture
a labor union that bargains with management over wages versus pensions taking into account how
much total compensation increases, if deferred compensation (pensions) is o®ered in lieu of current
compensation (wages). As an illustration, the bargaining between the United Automobile Workers
(UAW) and management of General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler resulted in a tenfold increase of
pensions from 1950 to 1980 compared to a four-fold increase of wages (see Kryvicky (1981) and
Loewenstein (2008)). Increased life expectancy certainly contributes to the increased demand for
pensions in this time period, but the tax bene¯ts of pensions over wages also appear large enough
to play an important role.
Pension funds gradually increase from a negligible stock ownership share at the end of World
War II to about 30 percent of the stock market in the mid 1980s, and the fraction of household
direct ownership decreases by approximately the same proportion. Mutual funds are insigni¯cant
shareholders until they are granted the tax status of pension funds following the enactment of 401(k)
1in 1982.1 Subsequently, mutual funds increase their ownership share from less than 3 percent in 1981
to more than 20 percent of the stock market today. The process of shifting stock ownership shares
from households to ¯nancial institutions is slow because retirement wealth is built through payroll
deduction.2 When the old generation of shareholders divests their directly-held stock portfolios,
the new generation of shareholders purchases stocks through a pension plan.
The evolution of aggregate stock ownership of the United States re°ects the experience of one
country with its speci¯c tax policy. Therefore, to gain statistical power, we compile aggregate
ownership data and construct proxy variables for the tax bene¯ts of pensions from a detailed
decomposition of eight countries' tax codes over sixty years. We determine the decline in household
ownership (sell side) and ignore the increase in private pensions plans (buy side) because the
institutional variation across countries and over time makes it di±cult to identify which institutions
carry pension assets on their balance sheets. With this in mind, we provide statistical evidence for
the hypothesis that tax policy has shaped the ownership structure of stock markets. In particular,
we ¯nd that proxy variables capturing the bene¯t from tax-free investment returns are correlated
with changes in the fraction of household ownership, while proxy variables for the bene¯t of income
smoothing have no explanatory power. For calibrated parameters, the compound-interest e®ect of
tax-free dividends and capital gains appears large enough to justify the gigantic shift in aggregate
stock ownership that has taken place since World War II.
In the United States, the principles for the taxation of pensions date back to the Revenue Act
of 1921 (TRA 1921), but at this point of time personal income taxes are relatively small. Personal
income taxes jump in the beginning of World War II, and pension funds begin to grow a few
years later. Interestingly and important for the argument, income taxes remain at high levels after
World War II and, in fact, rapidly increase through the combination of nominally-¯xed tax tables
and in°ation (bracket creep). Shareholders are a®ected through income taxation of dividends and
through capital gains taxation of nominal price increases. By the 1970s, the US upper-middle class
1The 401(k) plan is enacted by the Revenue Act of 1978 (TRA 1978), but the plan does not become e®ective
before the contribution limits are speci¯ed by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA 1981).
2There is no incentive to invest after-tax dollars into a pension plan which would subject such income to a second
round of personal income tax upon withdrawal. In recent years, growth is also restricted by statutory contribution
limits (see Jagadeesh, Kotliko®, and Warshawsky (2004)) for the history of contribution limits).
2is exposed to marginal tax rates above 50 percent. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986) cuts
marginal tax rates in half, and tax tables become in°ation protected, but by this point in time,
pension funds have become the largest shareholders of the US stock market.
The evolution of stock ownership and e®ective tax rates in the United Kingdom and Sweden
are similar to that of the United States except that income taxes climb to even higher levels in the
1970s. In Sweden, for example, the fraction of household ownership decreases by two percentage
points per year from 1970{1990 when marginal tax rates on dividends exceed 80 percent for middle-
income households. In the United Kingdom and Sweden, the correlation between the decrease in
household ownership and the proxy variables for tax-free returns is statistically signi¯cant within
the time-series of each country. Stock ownership and e®ective tax rates of the other countries in
our sample, notably Finland, France, Germany, and Japan, follow a di®erent path. The time-series
of household ownership begin at a lower level with signi¯cant inter-corporate ownership, probably
as the result of transactions right before and during World War II. Income tax tables are subject
to the same in°ationary pressure, but unlike the United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden,
shareholders are protected by dividend-tax credits and exemptions of long-term capital gains from
personal income tax. The explanatory power of the panel regression comes from the di®erent paths
taken by the two groups of countries through the in°ation period of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.3
One would expect that the same tax policy that has shaped stock ownership structure has also
shaped bond ownership structure. Our analysis of bond ownership structure is signi¯cantly less
elaborate than for stocks due to the lack of international data. In the beginning of the 20th century,
households are the dominant bondholders, similar to stocks (Guthman (1950)). However, in order
to ¯nance World War II, massive amounts of government debt is sold to ¯nancial institutions whose
bond ownership share dwarfs that of households. By the end of the war, the fraction of household
ownership has dropped to 10 percent of the taxable bond market (excluding savings bonds and
municipal bonds). After the war, when banks unwind their treasury bond portfolios and return
to their traditional role as providers of business loans, households do not rebuild their taxable
3Notice that Finland, France, Germany, and Japan, unlike the other countries, the United States, United Kingdom,
and Sweden, experienced severe in°ation during or right after World War II (for more analysis on this correlation,
see Perotti and Schwienbacher (2009)).
3bond portfolios through direct ownership. Instead, households purchase bonds through pension
funds and, following the 401(k), through mutual funds. Pension funds accumulate 20 percent of
the taxable bond market (mid 1980s) and mutual funds 10 percent. Foreign institutions, many
of which are central banks and not subject to United States taxation, are the largest bondholders
today.
Establishing a link between tax policy and ownership structure is important for numerous
reasons. First, stock prices would have been much lower without the dynamic tax clientele shift from
households to pension funds. Sialm (2009) provides supporting evidence of the relation between
stock prices and e®ective tax rates. The stock price level matters to investors who hold stocks
in their portfolios, to corporations that issue securities, and to governments which give up tax
revenues. Second, stock ownership structure may have implications for corporate governance (see,
e.g., Friedman (1996) and Blackburn (2002)). If large tax subsidies are given to the ¯nancial
intermediation industry, it is pertinent that ¯nancial institutions hold e±cient portfolios and act
responsibly in corporate governance matters. Third, the time-series evidence suggests that personal
tax has become increasingly less relevant for tax policy and research in ¯nancial economics as
ownership shares have migrated from taxed households to tax-deferred pension plans. Nevertheless,
personal tax on dividends and capital gains appear regularly in the policy debate, and textbooks
in corporate ¯nance present theories of capital structure and payout policy under the assumption
that households own all shares.
Our paper is related to a large literature on tax clienteles in the stock and bond markets.
Important theoretical contributions include Brennan (1970) (stock market), Miller (1977) (bond
market), and Auerbach and King (1983) (stock and bond market together). The empirical search
for tax clientele e®ects has examined cross-sections of stock returns (Black and Scholes (1974),
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979)), abnormal stock returns around the ex-dividend day (Elton
and Gruber (1970)), direct stock ownership data (Dahlquist, Robertsson, and Rydqvist (2009)),
and household portfolio data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (Poterba and Samwick (2003)).
Tax clientele e®ects are hard to detect in cross-section data. Our paper suggest that the main piece
of evidence can be found in the time-series. Ippolito (1986) labels the dynamic tax clientele shift
4\the tax theory of pension funds". We contribute supportive statistical evidence of this theory.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Stylized facts about the evolution of aggregate
ownership structure of stocks and bonds are provided in Section 2 and Section 3. The rest of
the paper constructs the panel regression. Section 4 presents the tax theory of pension funds and
the empirical methodology. Section 5 discusses personal income tax systems in the eight sample
countries. Section 6 presents the panel regression results, and Section 7 concludes. The appendix
provides details on the tax rules in each of the sample countries.
2 Evolution of Stock Ownership
This section reports common trends in aggregate stock ownership in eight developed countries: the
United States, Japan, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, Sweden, and Finland.
2.1 Stock Ownership Data
Annual ownership statistics exist for the United States since 1945, Japan 1949, Germany 1950,
Canada 1961, and France 1977. Time-series of ownership data for Sweden begin 1950, United
Kingdom 1957, and Finland 1958, but data are incomplete and only available for some years. The
data sources are listed in the notes of Table 1. The US ownership shares are reported as fractions
of listed and non-listed stocks. The data are constructed by the Federal Reserve, which starts
with the market value of listed stocks, adds an estimate of non-listed stocks, eliminates inter-
corporate ownership, and subtracts the ownership of ¯nancial institutions. The residual is labeled
the \household sector" and consists of households and non-pro¯t organizations. The Canadian
ownership shares are constructed as in the United States except that the total is de¯ned as the
book value of listed and non-listed stocks. The household sector is derived as the residual and
consists of actual households and non-pro¯t organizations. Inter-corporate ownership is explicit,
but quite small. The Japanese ownership shares are reported as fractions of the number of shares
outstanding before 1970 and as fractions of market values from 1970 onwards. Given that household
portfolios tend to be concentrated in small cap stocks, the aggregate household ownership share in
1949{1970 is likely to be overestimated. For the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Sweden,
5the ownership shares are fractions of market values. The UK ownership statistics are based on
company surveys with the most recent ownership statistics from the share registry. The o±cial
share registry is also the basis for the ownership statistics from recent years in Sweden (since 1975)
and Finland (since 1994). The older data from Sweden and Finland are compiled using a variety
of methods.4
In the regression analysis below, we analyze changes rather than levels of ownership. Di®erent
data construction methods do not in°uence the statistical inference, if the level is uncorrelated
with changes in ownership. However, in this section, we are interested in comparing levels of
ownership across countries. The methodology used by the Federal Reserve means that the US
household sector is upward biased relative to the fraction of household ownership in the other
sample countries. The bias arises from including non-listed stocks and non-pro¯t organizations, and
from eliminating inter-corporate ownership. The bias from non-listed stocks can be estimated from
the di®erence between the Flow of Funds total and stock market capitalization, and the ownership
of non-pro¯t organizations is available from 1987{2000 (Table L.100a). Non-listed stocks and non-
pro¯t organizations account for approximately four percentage points each of the household sector.
Correcting for these biases, the fraction of household ownership in the United States is 30 percent as
of 2006. We have no methodology to estimate inter-corporate ownership.5 The Canadian household
sector is also upward biased. The book value of listed and non-listed stocks exceeds the market
value of listed stocks by 26 percent over the 1980{2005 period. Therefore, we adjust the fractions
from Statistics Canada by the overshooting 26 percent. Speci¯cally, for households, we subtract
0.26 from the observed fraction of household ownership and divide by 0.74. For all others sectors,
we divide the observed fraction of ownership by 0.74. The adjusted fraction of household ownership
in 2006 is 29 percent.
4Sweden: the 1950 data are based on a survey of household ¯nances by Statistics Sweden. The 1961 and 1970 data
are computed as the residual from point estimates of the portfolios of ¯nancial institutions and business corporations.
The ownership fractions are based on market values. Finland: the 1958 data are based on tax-assessed values, the
1972 data on market values, and the 1980{1986 data on nominal share values.
5Poterba and Samwick (1995) and French (2008) make further attempts to adjust the household sector.
62.2 Common Stock Ownership Patterns
Table 1 reports the level of stock ownership for six broad investor classes at three points of time:
the earliest available data point, 1990, and the most recent data point. For Japan and Germany,
we choose 1953 as the starting point to eliminate the e®ects of some initial turbulence shortly after
World War II. The table provides several clear patterns.
Household ownership decreases. Column (1) shows that the reduction in the fraction of
household ownership is very large. The di®erence between the ownership shares in the ¯rst and
the third rows in each panel measures how much it falls since World War II. The equally-weighted
average of the decline across the eight countries is 39.4 percent.
Financial institutions ownership increases. The ownership fractions of pension funds, in-
vestment funds, and insurance companies are shown in columns (2){(4). Many of these institutions
are engaged in the retirement business. 6 The growth in ¯nancial institutions is large. To get a
quantitative measure of the long-term growth, we sum across columns (2){(4) and take the di®er-
ence between the sum in the ¯rst and the third rows in each panel. The average di®erence across
the eight countries is 24.2 percent.
Inter-corporate ownership increases before 1990. Inter-corporate ownership in column (5)
is signi¯cant in the countries placed in the bottom of Table 1. The average di®erence between the
¯rst and the second row in Sweden, Japan, Germany, and Finland is 12.7 percent. We exclude
France with a relatively short time-series.
Foreign ownership increases after 1990. The foreign ownership fraction is reported in col-
umn (6). Foreign ownership takes o® in 1990 after the removal of capital controls (OECD (2002)).7
6U.S. pensions are managed by pension funds, mutual funds, and life insurance companies. In Canada and United
Kingdom, pension funds and life insurance companies dominate the retirement business. Life insurance companies
o®er funded pension plans in Germany, Sweden, and Finland, where pension funds are small. In Japan, trust banks
are large providers of private pensions. Finally, in Germany, Japan, and Sweden, pension liabilities also appear as
reserves on the company's books.
7Capital controls in Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden, and United Kingdom were adopted in
preparation for or during World War II. Other countries established capital controls in the immediate reconstruction
period after the war. Canada removed its capital controls in 1951 and Germany in 1958. The United States had
7Table 1: Evolution of Stock Ownership
Pension Investment Insurance Non-¯nancial Foreign
Households funds funds companies businesses investors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
United States
1945 93.1 0.0 1.5 2.3 n/a 2.3
1990 55.5 25.2 7.1 4.6 n/a 6.9
2006 38.5 20.2 22.9 6.6 n/a 10.3
Canada
1961 48.6 2.7 2.4 2.0 4.0 27.0
1990 44.9 22.2 4.4 5.6 1.8 6.1
2006 28.9 18.5 13.3 11.2 1.1 9.9
United Kingdom
1957 65.8 3.4 5.7 8.8 2.7 4.4
1990 20.3 31.7 7.7 20.4 2.8 11.8
2004 14.1 15.7 5.2 17.2 0.6 32.6
Sweden
1950 70.0 2.5 0.0 1.5 5.1 7.5
1990 18.1 8.0 8.5 14.6 22.3 7.7
2006 14.3 5.3 11.2 8.1 9.0 37.2
Japan
1953 53.8 n/a 6.7 n/a 13.5 1.7
1990 20.4 10.7 3.7 15.9 30.1 4.7
2006 18.1 21.4 4.7 7.6 20.7 26.7
Germany
1953 32.8 n/a n/a 1.2 39.9 10.7
1990 17.8 n/a 1.3 11.7 43.4 12.7
2005 12.5 n/a 5.1 12.4 27.8 20.1
France
1977 29.5 n/a 7.3 6.4 25.3 8.5
1990 26.2 n/a 10.8 7.2 23.3 15.4
2005 6.9 n/a 13.4 5.7 21.3 39.5
Finland
1958 52.1 n/a n/a 1.6 12.9 3.1
1990 24.8 n/a n/a 10.1 26.5 8.0
2004 8.7 3.8 0.1 1.4 3.4 70.7
The table shows the ownership shares of broad investor classes. Pension funds include private pension funds,
public pension funds, social security funds and, in Japan, trust banks and annuity trusts. Investment funds are
mutual funds, closed-end funds, and exchange-traded funds. In Sweden and Germany, closed-end funds and holding
companies are not included. Insurance companies represent life insurance and property and casualty insurance. The
rows do not add up to 100 percent. The ownership of banks, holding companies, non-pro¯t organizations, the public
sector, and other investor classes are omitted. Data sources: Flow of Funds (United States); Statistics Canada;
Revell and Moyle (1966), Moyle (1971), and Statistics United Kingdom; Spº ant (1975), Boman (1982), and Statistics
Sweden; the Shareholder Survey and the Fact Book of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (Japan); Deutsches Aktieninstitut
(Germany); Bank of France; Grandell (1959), Laakso (1979), Airaksinen and Kallinen (1987), Karhunen and
Keloharju (2001) (Finland).
8Foreign ownership decreases between 1961 and 1990 in Canada when the country gains political
independence from the United Kingdom.
Figure 1a: Evolution of Stock Ownership
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The ¯gure shows the percentage aggregate ownership fraction of households (solid diamonds and
lines) and ¯nancial institutions (open diamonds and dashed lines) de¯ned as pension funds, mutual
funds, and insurance companies.
Figure 1a plots the complete time-series of household and institutional ownership (pension funds,
investment funds, and insurance companies) in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and
Sweden. We use di®erent symbols, diamonds versus lines, to mark the merger of time-series with
di®erent qualities. Households are represented by solid diamonds and solid lines, and ¯nancial
capital controls in place during the Vietnam War (1963{1973). The process of removing capital controls began in the
United Kingdom in 1979 and continued in Japan 1980, Australia 1983, France 1986, Sweden 1989, Italy and Norway
1990, and Finland 1991.
9institutions by open diamonds and dashed lines. The decrease in household ownership corresponds
closely to the increase in institutional ownership in the United States, Canada, and United King-
dom. In Sweden, non-¯nancial corporations pick up the residual (not shown). The plots illustrate
Figure 1b: Evolution of Stock Ownership
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The ¯gure shows the percentage aggregate ownership fraction of households (solid diamonds and
lines) and ¯nancial institutions (open diamonds and dashed lines) de¯ned as pension funds, mutual
funds, and insurance companies.
that the rate of change varies over time. In the United States, the fraction of household owner-
ship decreases at an accelerating rate before TRA 1986. In Canada, the fraction of household
ownership does not begin its decline until 1980. In the United Kingdom, household ownership de-
creases steadily until 1990 after which the time-series of household ownership becomes stationary.
In Sweden, we observe a dramatic reduction in the fraction of household ownership between 1970
and 1990, when the ownership fraction decreases by 40 percentage points or by approximately two
10percentage points per year.
Figure 1b plots the time-series of household and institutional ownership in Japan, Germany,
France, and Finland. The four plots emphasize interesting cross-country variation relative to the
countries in Figure 1a. Household ownership decreases slowly in Japan in 1970{2006 when own-
ership shares are based on market values (portion represented by the solid line), in Germany
throughout most of the post-war period, and in France and Finland before the entrance of foreign
investors around 1990. The starting point for the fraction of household ownership is also lower than
in Figure 1a. We do not know much about ownership structure before World War II. Small-sample
evidence by Franks, Mayer, and Wagner (2005) suggests that the transformation from direct own-
ership by households to intercorporate ownership takes place in Germany in the 1920s and the
1930s.
Figure 2: Households' Direct Ownership Fraction of Stocks
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The ¯gure shows the aggregate fraction of household direct ownership of equity in 20 countries. The
data are the most recently available between 2004 and 2006. Data sources: Flow of Funds (United
States), Statistics Canada, Australian Bureau of Statistics, FESE (2007), Goldman & Sachs (New
Zealand), and Nordic Central Securities Depository (Finland and Sweden). The number for the
United States has been adjusted for the ownership of closely-held ¯rms and non-pro¯t organizations.
The number for Canada has been adjusted for closely-held equity as explained in the text below.
In Figure 2, we summarize the fraction of household ownership in recent years for countries
with developed stock markets. There is not a single country where households own more than half
of the equity market directly, with the average across countries being just 17 percent. In the former
11Eastern Europe, where stock markets reopened recently, the fraction of household ownership ranges
from 3.9 percent (Hungary) to 18.1 percent (Slovenia) (FESE (2007)).
2.3 U.S. Mutual Funds
Figure 3: Stock Ownership of U.S. Mutual Funds and Pension Funds
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The two ¯gures show the stock ownership fractions of private and public pension funds and of
mutual funds in percent of all stocks. The ¯gure for mutual funds also marks the introduction of
401(k) plans in 1982. Source: Flow of Funds.
Figure 3 plots the complete time-series of stock ownership shares of U.S. pension funds and
mutual funds, respectively (see Table 1). Pension funds grow after World War II. Their ownership
share peaks in 1985. Mutual funds are initially small and do not begin to grow before the contri-
bution limits for employer-sponsored 401(k) plans have been speci¯ed by the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA 1981). We see a decline in the ownership share of pension funds after
1985 when retirement assets move from de¯ned bene¯t plans managed by pension funds to de¯ned
contribution plans managed by mutual funds. Mutual funds manage both taxed and tax-deferred
investment accounts. The split is not known. Data from the Investment Company Institute suggest
that the tax-deferred portion is somewhere between 40 and 80 percent.
123 Evolution of Bond Ownership
In this section, we report the evolution of aggregate bond ownership in the United States. We
argue that the ¯nancing needs of World War II exceed the lending capacity of the household sector
(crowding out). After the war, when Government borrowing needs decrease, households rebuild
their bond portfolios inside pension funds and not through direct bond ownership.
Figure 4: U.S. Bond Market Composition and Ownership
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The top left ¯gure shows US Government debt as a percent of marketable debt (treasury, agency,
corporate, municipal, and savings bonds). The other three ¯gures show ownership in percent of fully
taxable debt (excluding municipal and savings bonds). The ¯rst ¯ve data points from 1920{1940
are taken from Guthman (1950) (Table 1, 3, and 5). The data from 1945{2007 are from Flow of
Funds (Table L.209{L.212).
Annual bond ownership data are constructed by the Federal reserve. The household sector is
de¯ned as the residual after subtracting the ownership shares of ¯nancial institutions. Five-annual
data points are also provided by Guthman (1950) from 1920{1945. He reports the ownership frac-
13tions of insurance companies, commercial banks, savings banks, and the Federal Reserve. The
residual is composed of households and foreign (institutional) investors, but we label it the house-
hold sector. The top left plot of Figure 4 reports Government debt as a percent of marketable debt
including treasury, agency, corporate, municipal, and savings bonds. In the other three plots, we
report ownership shares of fully taxable debt (treasury, agency, and corporate), but we eliminate
municipal bonds with tax-exempt interest and savings bonds with taxation deferred to redemption.
Several clear patterns emerge:
Government debt crowds out private debt during World War II. The US Government
issues treasury securities to ¯nancial institutions and savings bonds to households to ¯nance World
War II. At the end of the war, treasury securities (70 percent) and savings bonds (15 percent)
dominate the public debt market. Government borrowing subsequently falls back to its pre-war
level.
Households vanish during World War II. The fraction of household ownership reaches a
long-term equilibrium already during World War II. Today, it is less than 10 percent if we subtract
the ownership shares of non-pro¯t organizations and bonds held in Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs).8
Banks peak during World War II. Banks purchase treasury securities to ¯nance the war.
After World War II, banks unwind their Treasury bond portfolios and return to their traditional
role as providers of business loans.
Pension funds and mutual funds grow after World War II. Households rebuild their
bond portfolios inside pension funds and not through direct ownership. Mutual funds grow after
401(k). The ownership share of mutual funds can be seen as the di®erence between the solid line
above (pension funds and mutual funds together) and the dashed line below (pension funds alone).
Pension funds and mutual funds reach together 20 percent of the bond market at the end of the
8The average ownership share of non-pro¯ts from 1987-2000 is 3 percent. Using data from the Investment Company
Institute, we estimate that bonds held in IRAs average to approximately 3 percent from 1992-2006.
14time-series.
Figure 5: Evolution of US Municipal Bond Ownership
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The ¯gure shows ownership of US state and municipal bonds in percent of the outstanding stock.
The ¯rst ¯ve data points from 1920{1940 are taken from Guthman (1950) (Table 4). The data from
1945{2007 are taken from Flow of Funds (Table L.211).
We close the bond ownership section with a brief look at the municipal bond market. Municipal
bonds constitute 15 percent of the US bond market (including municipal bonds and savings bonds).
Like private borrowing, municipal bonds are crowded out during the war, when the municipal
bond fraction drops to 5 percent. During the 1980s, households and mutual funds increases their
ownership share by approximately 50 percentage points at the expense of banks. Banks leave the
municipal bond market after TRA 1986 eliminates a tax arbitrage.9 As with other marketable
securities, mutual funds grow post-401(k) but, in the case of municipal bonds, mutual fund growth
cannot be tax motivated. We see the mutual fund ownership share as the di®erence between the
solid line above (households and mutual funds combined) and the dashed line below (households
only). The mutual fund share increases particularly after the Orange County default in 1994.
Diversi¯cation is the likely explanation for the increased demand for municipal bonds held through
mutual funds. Consistent with tax incentives, however, pension funds, insurance companies, and
foreign investors do not hold low-yield municipal bonds.
9Interest expense on debt that is used to ¯nance municipal bond portfolios is no longer deductible from corporate
income after TRA 1986.
154 Hypothesis and Methodology
4.1 Tax Theory of Pension Funds
The principles for the taxation of pensions date back to the Revenue Act of 1921 (TRA 1921),
which states that employer and employee contributions to private pension plans are made before
tax, investment returns grow tax free, and distributions are taxed as personal income.10 The
consumption-tax treatment of pensions is di®erent from the income-tax treatment of regular sav-
ings, where contributions are taxed at the time of investment, investment returns are taxed upon
realization, but distributions are exempt from personal tax. The tax code requires that a pension
liability is backed by o®-balance sheet assets held by a ¯nancial intermediary. Therefore, house-
holds must choose indirect ownership to earn the related tax bene¯ts.11 Ippolito (1986) proposes
the hypothesis that the growth of pension funds in the United States is a direct consequence of the
di®erence in taxation of pensions and regular savings.
The following stylized setting illustrates the argument. Suppose an individual chooses between
saving inside or outside a pension plan. The annual rate of return is r and the time to retirement is
N years. Personal income is taxed at rate ¿0 when it is earned and at rate ¿w when it is withdrawn.
Investment returns outside the pension plan are taxed at rate ¿i;i = 1;:::;N. All taxes and the
horizon are known at time 0. Consider an individual who decides to set aside $100 pre-tax money
for retirement. If he invests outside the pension plan, the after-tax payo® after N years equals:
H = [100(1 ¡ ¿0)] £ [1 + r(1 ¡ ¿i)]N: (1)
Equation (1) shows that savings are taxed at rate ¿0 when income is earned and at rate ¿i when
capital income is reinvested. Hence, household savings outside the pension plan are taxed twice.
Alternatively, if the individual saves inside the pension plan, the after-tax payo® after N years
10The consumption-tax treatment of funded pension schemes appears to be the general principle across countries.
The unfunded pension plan in France (pay as you go) constitutes an exception.
11Individual retirement accounts (IRAs) that allow households to hold stocks directly are relatively recent additions.
IRAs can be found in Canada from 1957, United States 1975, France 1990, Sweden 1994, and Germany 2002. Using
data from the Investment Company Institute (ICI), we estimate that 3 percent of US equities are held directly in
IRAs. Even then, there is a transaction cost advantage of pooling small contributions (payroll withdrawals) into a
large purchases, and most stock IRAs are invested in mutual funds.
16equals:
P =
h
100(1 + r)N
i
£ (1 ¡ ¿w): (2)
Contributions to the pension plan can be made with pre-tax money, investment returns grow tax
free, and distributions are taxed at rate ¿w. Hence, savings inside the pension plan are taxed only
once. Equations (1) and (2) are equal and the individual is indi®erent between saving outside or
inside the pension plan if ¿0 = ¿w and ¿i = 0 for all i. This implies that saving inside the pension
plan o®ers two potential tax bene¯ts. First, the individual bene¯ts from income smoothing when
the tax schedule is progressive and ¿0 > ¿w, i.e., the individual reduces his lifetime tax burden
by saving when income is high and withdrawing when income is low. Second, investment returns
inside the pension plan grow tax free, ¿i = 0. Equations (1) and (2) do not explicitly account for
corporate tax because wages and contributions to private pension funds are both tax deductible
expenses for the ¯rm.12 13
4.2 Empirical Measures
First, we construct a measure of the tax bene¯t of income smoothing. Following Ippolito (1986), we
assume certainty, zero risk-free interest rate, and constant lifetime income. An individual works N
years and needs retirement income for M years. Let Y denote annual income and T(Y ) tax liability
on this income. The life-cycle hypothesis implies that the individual chooses the same consumption
rate Á = N=(N + M) throughout his lifetime. See Figure 6 for an example where the number of
work years is N = 40 and time in retirement M = 13 years. Annual income during work years is
Y = 1. Smoothed over lifetime, annual income decreases to ÁY = 13=53 ¼ 0:75.
If the individual makes regular savings outside the pension plan, lifetime tax liability equals
N ¢ T(Y ). If instead the individual saves inside the pension plan, he can save pre-tax income and
12In Germany, Japan, and Sweden, where pension liabilities are held on the books, contributions are made before
tax, but corporate tax must be paid, when the book reserves are dissolved. Hence, corporate tax is deferred along
with personal tax. This is a feature that we ignore.
13Contributions to the Social Security system are levied on wages, but not on employer contributions to private
pension plans. Escaping social security tax is, therefore, an additional tax bene¯t of saving inside a pension plan
that we ignore. Social security taxes are capped and, therefore, irrelevant at higher income levels that matter more
for contributions to private pension plans. There are exceptions. In the United States, the cap on payments into the
public health system (medicare) is removed in 1990 and, in Sweden, where social security tax rates are quite high,
the cap on social security contributions is removed in 1968.
17Figure 6: Life-Cycle Consumption Model
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The ¯gure shows annual pre-tax income (solid line) during work years and annual pre-tax
income if smoothed over work and retirement years (dashed line).
lifetime tax liability on earned income becomes (N +M)¢T(ÁY ). We measure lifetime tax savings
from income smoothing as a fraction of lifetime income taxes:
SMOOTH = 1 ¡
T(ÁY )=Á
T(Y )
: (3)
Tax liability is lower when the individual saves inside the pension plan and the tax code is progres-
sive. SMOOTH quanti¯es the maximum bene¯t to income smoothing if implemented optimally
over lifetime. It is larger with a more volatile income stream (we assume constant income), while
saving for other reasons than minimizing tax liability reduces it.
Next, we construct a measure of the bene¯t of avoiding tax on investment income. Let d be the
expected dividend yield, g the expected capital gains rate, and ¿d and ¿g the marginal tax rates on
dividends and capital gains, respectively. The expected rate of return from holding stocks inside
the pension plan is:
r = (1 + d)(1 + g) ¡ 1 ¼ d + g; (4)
and the expected rate of return from direct stock ownership outside the pension plan is:
r¿ = [1 + d(1 ¡ ¿d)] £ [1 + g(1 ¡ ¿g)] ¡ 1 ¼ (1 ¡ ¿d)d + (1 ¡ ¿g)g: (5)
18In°ation is central to the empirical analysis and we therefore work with real rates of return. Let
i denote the expected in°ation rate. A simple measure of the bene¯t of tax-free returns is the
di®erence between the real rate of return from holding stocks inside and outside the pension plan:
GAP =
¿dd + ¿gg
1 + i
: (6)
Expected in°ation enters the equation in the denominator. It also enters in the marginal tax rates
¿d and ¿g (bracket creep) and in the capital gains growth rate g because capital gains taxation is
nominal.
4.3 Asset Location Problem
Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) argue that it may be tax ine±cient to hold both stocks and bonds
inside the pension plan. Suppose that the tax-minimization problem can be separated from the
portfolio investment problem. Then, a tax-minimizing pension plan is entirely invested in either
bonds or stocks. Speci¯cally, swapping one dollar of stock investment for one dollar of bond
investment inside the pension plan renders the additional real rate increase:
SWAP =
¿rr
1 + i
¡
¿dd + ¿gg
1 + i
; (7)
where r is the interest rate and ¿r the associated marginal tax rate. The ¯rst term on the right
hand side is the real rate di®erence between holding bonds inside or outside the pension plan (GAP
for bonds). The second term is the corresponding real rate bene¯t of holding stocks inside the
pension plan (GAP for stocks). Allowing investment returns to grow at the before-tax rate inside
the pension plan raises after-tax income. Investing the pension fund entirely in the higher taxed
security, i.e., bonds if SWAP is positive and stocks otherwise, raises disposable income further.
Choosing parameters from the United States, Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) argue that pension
plans should be entirely invested in bonds with the desired stock portfolio held on the ¯rm's balance
sheet ¯nanced with debt. A similar argument can be developed for self-directed household accounts
19such as 401(k) and IRAs.14 If pension fund managers and households would act this way, the tax
theory of pension funds cannot be true. However, the prescription of Black (1980) and Tepper
(1981) is not supported by the data. Some pension fund managers tilt their investments towards
bonds (Frank (2002)), but, in the aggregate, pension funds are 70 percent invested in stocks, and
many households hold stock portfolios inside their pension plans (Poterba and Samwick (2003)).
The critical assumption of Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) is that the tax-minimization problem
can be separated from the portfolio investment problem, which in turn requires that: (i) the plan
sponsor can borrow and lend at the same rate, (ii) interest grows tax-free inside the pension plan
and is fully deductible outside the plan, and (iii) the sponsor has su±cient operating income to
service the long-term debt ¯nancing of the stock portfolio. Judging from the portfolio behavior of
pension funds and households, at least one of these conditions is violated, and we will continue our
empirical investigation of the tax theory of pension funds under the assumption that the bond-stock
arbitrage is not doable.
4.4 Parameters
The empirical variables SMOOTH and GAP require parameter estimates for marginal tax rates,
expected stock returns, in°ation, and demographics. Tax rates are collected from a variety of
sources listed in the Appendix. GDP per capita is taken from International Monetary Fund (2009),
dividend yields from Global Financial Data, and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from International
Historical Statistics (Mitchell (2007)). Life-expectancy statistics are available from the Human
Mortality Database.15
4.4.1 Marginal Tax Rates
We construct a proxy for the marginal tax rate of a representative household that chooses between
holding stocks inside or outside a pension plan. We assume that the representative household has the
following two features: First, it has high enough income that government-provided, public pensions
14See Shoven (1999), Shoven and Sialm (2003), Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2004), Huang (2008).
15University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). Avail-
able at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de.
20are insu±cient to cover consumption needs during retirement years. Second, the representative's
income is low enough that the maximum retirement bene¯ts from private pension plans are a
signi¯cant portion of retirement income. As our base case, we assume that the representative
household has an annual income of ¯ve times GDP per capita (GDP5). The marginal tax rate
of this household on dividend income can be computed from tax tables and GDP-per-capita time
series. While the choice of the multiple ¯ve is somewhat arbitrary, we examine the robustness of
our results to alternative income multiples.
Capital gains taxation is markedly di®erent from dividend taxation. The statutory tax rate on
long-term capital gains is usually lower than the statutory rate on short-term gains and it is often
zero, and capital gains tax can be postponed until the stock is sold. The value of deferral of capital
gains has been subject to much debate. Miller (1977) refers to conventional folk wisdom that 10
years of tax deferral is almost as good as exemption from tax. Bailey (1969) calculates the value of
deferral to 50 percent of the statutory rate, Protopapadakis (1983) ¯nds estimates in the order of
25 percent, and Chay, Choi, and Ponti® (2006) ¯nd it to be 55 percent. Green and Holli¯eld (2003)
model the advantage of deferral and ¯nd numerically that the e®ective tax rate on capital gains
amounts to approximately 50{60 percent of the statutory rate. In spite of no consensus, we assume
that the e®ective capital gains tax rate is 50 percent of the long-term statutory rate evaluated at
the annual income ¯ve times GDP per capita.
4.4.2 Expected Stock Returns and In°ation
Estimates of expected dividend yield and capital gains rate are intrinsically noisy. We make simple
¯rst-order approximations and pursue a number of robustness checks. We assume that the expected
dividend yield is d = 4 percent, and that the expected capital gains rate is 2 percent plus expected
in°ation measured as a three-year moving average of changes in CPI. Our approach means that
we treat payout policy as exogenous and do not allow for supply-side adjustments to changes in
tax policy (e.g., Black (1976), Chetty and Saez (2005)). Our rough parameter assumptions are
somewhat in line with the data. The pooled cross-section and time-series average dividend yield
in our sample is 3.6 percent. The time-series of cross-country average dividend yields begins at 5.3
21percent in 1950 and ends at 2.3 percent in 2006.16 Stock price growth can be linked to GDP growth.
The geometric average real GDP growth rate in the pooled sample is 2.9 percent. The average is
in°uenced by high real growth rates after World War II, especially in Germany and Japan, so we
assume that investors expect lower real stock price growth. The assumptions on dividend yield
(4 percent) and capital gains yield (2 percent plus in°ation) imply that the expected real rate of
return on stocks is approximately 6 percent before tax, which is within the range reported by Fama
and French (2002) between 1951 and 2000: 4.74 percent using the dividend growth model and 6.51
percent using the earnings growth model.
4.4.3 Demographic Parameters
The numerical value of the tax bene¯t to income smoothing depends on demographic parameters.
We assume that an individual begins contributing to a pension plan at the age of 25 and retires
at the age of 65.17 We assume that households use life-expectancy statistics to predict the number
of years in retirement. For each country in our sample, we collect life-expectancy conditional on
age 25 and compute the cross-country average. Across countries, the time-series of average life
expectancy begins at 70 years in 1950 and ends at 81 years in 2006. These numbers imply that
the number of work years is N = 40 and the number of retirement years is M 2 [6:4;16:4]. The
number of retirement years is an approximately linearly increasing function of time. Accordingly,
the importance of saving for retirement increases over time. For simplicity, in our calculations of
SMOOTH, we ignore expected growth in life expectancy, i.e., we assume that a household that
starts saving for retirement in 1950 uses the life expectancy of 1950 to plan for retirement that
begins forty years later in 1990. Ignoring growth in life expectancy, downward biases the numerical
value of SMOOTH.
16Substantially lower dividend yields in the United States and United Kingdom after 1982 can partially be explained
by a dramatic increase in popularity of share repurchases following changes in regulations. Since share repurchases
are taxed di®erently from dividends, we do not include them in our calculations.
17Retirement at 65 has long been the norm in the countries we study. It was chosen in the social security system
of the United Kingdom in 1925 and in the United States in 1935.
225 Evolution of Household Taxation of Stocks
In this section, we study the time-series and cross-country properties of the two empirical measures
of the taxa bene¯t of pensions, SMOOTH and GAP. Since they are functions of tax rates, we begin
with an examination of the evolution of personal income tax.
5.1 Personal Income Tax on Stocks
Dividends are taxed as ordinary income, but many tax codes o®er a dividend-tax relief to reduce
the e®ects of double taxation of corporate income: Canada 1949, Japan 1950, France 1965, United
Kingdom 1973, Germany 1977, Sweden 1991, Finland 1993, and the United States 2003. The
United States begins taxing capital gains on stocks in 1916, but elsewhere taxation of long-term
capital gains is relatively recent: United Kingdom 1965, Sweden 1967, Canada 1972, and Finland
1986. In Germany, France, and Japan, long-term capital gains on stocks are e®ectively tax exempt
throughout the time period we study.
The sequence of plots contained in Figure 4a{d shows the evolution of marginal tax rates. In all
plots, the solid line above is the top statutory rate on ordinary income, and the dashed line below
is the top statutory rate on dividends. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory tax rate (solid
line) are the top income tax brackets expressed as multiples of GDP per capita. Below the top
statutory rates, we plot our proxies for the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and capital
gains (triangles) of our representative GDP5 household.
The top panel of Figure 7a shows the evolution of marginal tax rates in the United States.
We assume that state tax is a constant 5 percent. The top statutory rate on ordinary income
equals the top statutory rate on dividends between 1950 and 2002. Since 2003, dividends are taxed
at a lower rate. This change in the tax code is represented by the dashed line. Top statutory
income rates decrease from above 90 percent in the 1950s to below 40 percent in 2006. In 1950,
the GDP-per-capita multiple is 222 and thus relevant to few households. The multiple decreases
rapidly to 18 in 1980. After TRA 1986, the income multiple stays around eight. The marginal tax
rate on dividends for the GDP5 household (diamonds) stays around 30 percent in the 1950s and
1960s, it increases rapidly in the 1970s, and drops back to the 30 percent level after TRA 1986.
23Figure 7a: Marginal Tax Rates
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The ¯gure shows the top statutory tax rate (solid line), the top statutory rate on dividends (dashed
line), the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and long-term capital gains (triangles) of the
representative GDP5 household. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory rate are the top income
tax brackets expressed in multiples of GDP per capita. In Japan, the marginal tax rate depends
on the size of the dividend from each company. Case I, II, and III refer to a large, an intermediate,
and a small dividend, respectively.
24Figure 7b: Marginal Tax Rates
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The ¯gure shows the top statutory tax rate (solid line), the top statutory rate on dividends (dashed
line), the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and long-term capital gains (triangles) of the
representative GDP5 household. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory rate are the top income
tax brackets expressed in multiples of GDP per capita.
25Figure 7c: Marginal Tax Rates
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The ¯gure shows the top statutory tax rate (solid line), the top statutory rate on dividends (dashed
line), the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and long-term capital gains (triangles) of the
representative GDP5 household. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory rate are the top income
tax brackets expressed in multiples of GDP per capita.
26Figure 7d: Marginal Tax Rates
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The ¯gure shows the top statutory tax rate (solid line), the top statutory rate on dividends (dashed
line), the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and long-term capital gains (triangles) of the
representative GDP5 household. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory rate are the top income
tax brackets expressed in multiples of GDP per capita.
27These changes occur because tax tables are ¯xed and nominal income growth pushes households
into higher tax brackets. The bracket creep of the 1970s becomes an important part of Ronald
Reagan's presidential campaign and results in TRA 1986 with the formal indexation of tax tables.
The capital gains tax rate (triangles) is approximately constant around 10 percent.
The eight tax plots share several common features. In the ¯rst decade after World War II,
high top statutory rates on personal income are coupled with low marginal tax rates for the GDP5
household. In the subsequent decades, marginal tax rates drift upwards (bracket creep), and the
GDP-per-capita multiple at the top statutory rate decreases from an average well above 100 in
1950 to around 10 in 1980. In the extreme cases of Sweden and Finland (Figure 7c), the marginal
tax rates of the GDP5 household are equal to the top statutory rates in the 1970s and 1980s, and
the top statutory rate applies to an income multiple of only two. The bracket creep ends with
TRA 1986 and similar tax reforms in other countries: the United Kingdom 1988, Japan 1989,
Sweden 1991, and Finland 1993. In all countries, the marginal tax rates of the GDP5 household
become equal to top statutory rates after TRA 1986, but top statutory rates are much lower than
in the past.
5.2 Tax Bene¯ts of Pensions
We begin with the tax bene¯t of tax-free returns. The sample average GAP5 is about two percent.
It ranges from 1 percent in Germany to 2.8 percent in the United Kingdom. A two percent expected
return di®erence matters over long investment horizons. For example, suppose one dollar per year
is put into a savings account over 40 years. The future value of the savings account at 2 percent
interest rate is $60 compared to $40, which is the future value of a savings account that grows
without interest.
Figure 8 shows the evolution of GAP5 in each of the eight sample countries. In the United
States, United Kingdom, and Sweden, the path is hump shaped. GAP5 peaks in the 1970s together
with the increasing taxation of dividends (bracket creep) and capital gains taxation of purely
in°ationary price increases. For example, in the United Kingdom, GAP5 peaks at nearly six
percent, which implies that, under our assumptions, the expected real rate of return on stocks after
28Figure 8: Bene¯t of Tax-Free Returns
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The ¯gure shows the real rate of return di®erence between saving inside and outside a pension plan for a household
with an income multiple of ¯ve times GDP per capita (GAP5). The numbers are expressed in percent. We assume
that the expected dividend yield is d = 4 percent, expected real growth is g = 2 percent, and that expected in°ation
equals the three-year moving average. We also assume that the e®ective capital gains tax rate equals 50 percent
of the long-term statutory rate.
29tax is approximately zero.18 The other countries do not respond to the in°ation shock of the 1970s.
Shareholders in France, Germany, and Japan are protected from bracket creep by the dividend
tax credit, and capital gains are exempt from taxation. The importance of capital gains taxation
can also be seen in Canada and Finland, where GAP5 increases after the introduction of capital
gains taxation in 1972 and 1986{1992 (gradual increase), respectively, as well as in the United
Kingdom, where GAP5 drops in 1982 after capital gains are protected against in°ation through
indexation. A visual comparison of the GAP5 plots with those of household ownership in Figure 1a
and 1b suggests a strong correlation between changes in stock ownership structure and GAP5. In
Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States, the fraction of household ownership decreases fast
when GAP5 climbs to high levels in the 1970s, while in Japan and Germany, there is not much
time-series variation in either the fraction of household ownership or GAP5.
Next, we look at the tax bene¯t of income smoothing. Averages SMOOTH5 is positive because
personal tax tables are progressive. The average annual reduction in the tax bill in the pooled
sample is 7.3 percent. Our estimate is signi¯cantly less than 20% (Ippolito (1986)). Our estimate
is also quite small. It translates into an average reduction of the e®ective tax rate by only 2.7
percentage points.19 Figure 9 shows the evolution of SMOOTH5 in the eight countries. In the
United States and the United Kingdom, the time-series of SMOOTH5 display the same hump-
shaped path as GAP5, which peaks in the 1970s when tax progressivity is high. However, the
correlation coe±cient between GAP5 and SMOOTH5 in the pooled sample is small. In Sweden
and Finland, the time-series of SMOOTH5 is °at because marginal tax rates equal top statutory
rates at the GDP5 income level, and in Germany SMOOTH5 is high as a result of the unusual way
the marginal tax rate is determined (see the Appendix).
18Expected real rates of return outside the retirement account are not negative under the assumed parameter values
because real stock price growth is high (g = 2%) and the marginal tax rate on capital gains is low as a result of
deferral and low statutory rates on long-term capital gains.
19See Rydqvist, Schwartz, and Spizman (2010) for further analysis of the magnitude of the tax bene¯t of income
smoothing.
30Figure 9: Tax Bene¯t of Income Smoothing
United States
0
5
10
15
20
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
United Kingdom
0
5
10
15
20
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Sweden
0
5
10
15
20
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Germany
0
5
10
15
20
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Finland
0
5
10
15
20
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Japan
0
5
10
15
20
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Canada
0
5
10
15
20
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
France
0
5
10
15
20
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
The ¯gure shows the tax bene¯t to income smoothing for a household with an income multiple of ¯ve times GDP
per capita (SMOOTH5). The numbers are expressed in percent.
316 Household Ownership and the Tax Bene¯ts of Pensions
Our objective is to estimate households' aggregate response to the tax incentives to save inside a
pension plan. The response variable is the change in the fraction of household ownership ¢y, and
the incentive variables are GAP5 and SMOOTH5. We estimate the following pooled cross-section
and time-series regression model:
¢yit = a + b ¢ GAP5it + c ¢ SMOOTH5it + eit; (8)
and test whether the slope coe±cients are negative: b;c < 0. We report the results of our main
regression model ¯rst and discuss robustness checks afterwards. In our main regression model,
Table 2: Pooled Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant {0.92 {0.21 {0.15 0.27
({11.3)
¤¤¤ ({1.1) ({0.6) (1.0)
GAP5 {34.5
({6.6)
¤¤¤
Dividend term {39.2
({4.1)
¤¤¤
Capital gains term {28.2
({2.4)
¤¤
Dividend tax rate {2.0
({5.8)
¤¤¤
Capital gains tax rate {1.7
({1.8)
¤
SMOOTH5 1.4 1.3 {2.8
(0.6) (0.6) ({1.1)
R
2 0.000 0.043 0.044 0.039
#Obs 395 392 392 392
The table reports the results of regressing the households' annual percentage ownership change on proxy vari-
ables for the tax bene¯ts of saving inside a pension plan de¯ned by equations (6) and (3). The proxy variables
are functions of marginal tax rates that are evaluated at the income ¯ve times GDP per capita. The regres-
sions are estimated with generalized least squares and take into account within-country auto-correlation and
heteroscedasticity, and cross-country heteroscedasticity. t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coe±-
cients. Asterisk
¤,
¤¤, and
¤¤¤ denote signi¯cance level 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent or better, respectively,
against the null hypothesis that the coe±cient is zero.
we do not include lagged independent variables because the incentives to save inside a pension
32plan are slow-moving variables. Any delayed response is likely to be highly correlated with the
current values of the incentive variables. If there is an underlying time trend in the fraction of
household ownership such as the e®ect of increased life expectancy, then the time trend is captured
by the regression intercept. We estimate the regression with the eight-country panel data set.
The estimation procedure corrects for ¯rst-order autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity following
the procedure of Parks (1967).20 The time series of ownership are incomplete for the United
Kingdom, Sweden, and Finland, particularly in the beginning of the sample period. Missing values
are replaced by linearly interpolated data.
Table 2 reports our main results. Speci¯cation (1) ignores the tax variables and reports only
the average annual change in household ownership across the eight countries. The average decline
in the fraction of household ownership is 0.92 percent per year. Speci¯cations (2){(4) include the
tax variables. The coe±cient of GAP5 is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, while the coe±cient of
SMOOTH5 is not. Once we include the tax variables, the intercept term is not statistically di®erent
from zero. The magnitude of the regression coe±cient of GAP5 means that a three percentage point
di®erence between saving inside and outside a pension plan results in an annual reduction of the
fraction of household ownership by one percentage point. When we break down GAP5 into its
components (Speci¯cations (3) and (4)), we see that both terms and the marginal tax rates on
dividends and capital gains have explanatory power. These results suggest that both dividend tax
and capital gains tax matter.
Table 3 reports the results of estimating the regression model (8) decade by decade. We report
only the results using GAP5 and SMOOTH5 as regressors. The coe±cient of GAP5 is statistically
di®erent from zero in the three regressions covering the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but not otherwise.
These results demonstrate that the explanatory power of the regression model (8) is due to cross-
section variation in marginal tax rates during the high-in°ation period before TRA 1986. The
intercept is statistically di®erent from zero in the 1990s regression. It suggests that non-tax variables
reduce the fraction of household ownership in recent years.
We carry out many robustness checks. The results of varying the model parameters of GAP and
20In Table 2, we allow the autocorrelation coe±cient to be country speci¯c, while in Table 3 we use the same
autocorrelation coe±cient for all countries. The pooled autocorrelation coe±cient is 0.133.
33Table 3: Decade-by-Decade Regressions
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99
Constant {0.38 {0.59 0.21 {0.31 {1.80
({0.4) ({1.3) (0.9) ({0.6) ({2.5)
¤¤
GAP5 20.1 {23.6 {38.2 {32.9 25.6
(0.4) ({1.7)
¤ ({5.4)
¤¤¤ ({3.5)
¤¤¤ (0.8)
SMOOTH5 {13.5 7.6 0.8 2.7 8.5
({1.0) (1.8) (0.2) (0.6) (2.1)
R
2 0.158 0.210 0.090 0.100 0.027
#Obs 37 68 72 80 80
The table reports the regression results decade by decade. The dependent variable is the households' annual
percentage ownership change and the independent variables are proxy variables for the tax bene¯ts of saving
inside a retirement account. The proxy variables are functions of marginal tax rates that are evaluated at the
income ¯ve times GDP per capita. The regressions are estimated as in Table 2. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses below the coe±cients. Asterisk
¤,
¤¤, and
¤¤¤ denote signi¯cance level 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1
percent or better, respectively, against the null hypothesis that the coe±cient is zero.
SMOOTH are summarized in Table 4. In Speci¯cations (1) and (2), we evaluate the tax variables
at the income level GDP1 and the top statutory rate, respectively. Evaluating the tax variables at
other income multiples from GDP2 to GDP15 or at the average statutory rate produce regression
coe±cients that fall between these two extremes. The explanatory power of GAP is not a®ected,
while the coe±cients of SMOOTH remain insigni¯cant. We also vary the ¯nancial parameters
keeping the tax parameters constant (evaluated at GDP5). Speci¯cation (3) assumes that both the
dividend yield and the capital gains yield are zero. The stripped-down GAP variable measures the
impact of capital gains tax on in°ation. Intermediate combinations of positive dividend yields and
capital gains growth rates generate similar results. Speci¯cation (4) models expected dividend yield
as a three-year moving average keeping all other assumptions the same. Again, the explanatory
power of GAP is una®ected. The regression results are robust to varying the model parameters
because none of the alternatives change the ordering of high-tax versus low-tax countries during
the high-in°ation period before TRA 1986. The fraction of household ownership decreases fast in
the United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden where marginal tax rates are high and capital
gains are taxed. On the contrary, the fraction of household ownership decreases slowly in Germany
and Japan where marginal tax rates are low and capital gains are not taxed. Since the country
34Table 4: Robustness Checks
Tax parameters Financial parameters No parameters
GDP1 Top rate Zero yield Moving Dummy
average variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant {0.27 {0.14 {0.90 {0.54 {0.77
({2.0)
¤¤ ({0.9) ({5.1)
¤¤ ({2.8)
¤¤¤ ({8.9)
¤¤¤
GAP {42.1 {23.5 {57.1 {21.1
({6.0)
¤¤¤ ({5.6)
¤¤¤ ({4.6)
¤¤¤ ({5.3)
¤¤¤
SMOOTH {1.1 {1.8 2.5 1.7
({1.5) ({1.0) (1.0) (0.7)
Sweden {1.07
({4.2)
¤¤¤
United Kingdom {0.64
({3.0)
¤¤¤
United States {0.63
({1.9)
¤¤
Japan {0.42
({0.9)
Finland 0.10
(0.2)
France 0.18
(0.2)
Germany 0.39
(0.7)
Canada 0.54
(1.2)
R
2 0.044 0.035 0.022 0.031 0.046
#Obs 391 392 392 361 395
The table reports the results of varying the model parameters or GAP and SMOOTH. (1) The tax variables are
evaluated at an income multiple of one times GDP per capita. (2) The tax variables are evaluated at the top
statutory rate. (3) The tax variables are evaluated at zero dividend yield and zero capital gains yield. (4) The tax
variables are evaluated at the three-year moving average dividend yield. (5) Country dummy variables interacted
with an indicator variable for 1970{1989. The countries have been sorted from most negative coe±cient to most
positive. Asterisk
¤,
¤¤, and
¤¤¤ denote signi¯cance level 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent or better, respectively,
against the null hypothesis that the coe±cient is zero.
35ordering is preserved, only the magnitude of the regression coe±cients, and not the statistical
signi¯cance, changes across the alternative speci¯cations. The regression to the far right in Table 4
supports this interpretation. Speci¯cation (5) is a regression where the dummy variable for each
country is interacted with an indicator variable which equals one for 1970{1989 and zero otherwise.
The fraction of household ownership decreases in all countries. However, the fraction of household
ownership decreases faster in the United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden in 1970{1989 than in
other countries or other time periods. The tax variables pick up this time-series and cross-country
correlation. Any non-tax explanation must account for this particular pattern.
Finally, we experiment with the model speci¯cation. The fraction of household ownership
is bounded between zero and one, which implies that a reduction in the fraction of household
ownership must be smaller as the ownership level approaches the lower boundary. We see such
an e®ect in the most recent data after 1990 but, overall, the level is so far away from the lower
boundary that including the lagged fraction of household ownership makes no di®erence to the
regression results. We also allow the underlying time trend to vary across countries (i.e., country-
¯xed e®ects) with similar regression coe±cients. Out of all eight countries, only the coe±cient of
the dummy variable for Canada is statistically di®erent from zero.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the hypothesis that tax policy has shaped aggregate stock
ownership structure. There are three pieces of supporting evidence. First, we ¯nd that the fraction
of household ownership decreases relatively fast during the high-in°ation period of the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s in countries with high e®ective taxation of dividends and nominal stock price increases
(the United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden). The evolution of household ownership in those
countries stands in sharp contrast to the slow decrease in the fraction of household ownership
during the same time period in countries with low tax on dividends and untaxed capital gains
on stocks (Finland, France, Germany, and Japan). Second, mutual funds are small institutional
investors until they get included in the private retirement system through the 401(k). Third,
households are crowded out from the bond market during World War II. When households rebuild
36their bond portfolios after the war, they do so in tax-favored pension funds rather than through
direct ownership.
We have not studied alternative explanations and have, therefore, not attempted to develop
any control variables to be included in the regression model. There are alternative theories of
the growth of intermediated stock ownership. In a sequence of works, Allen and Gale (1994),
Allen and Santomero (1998), and Allen and Gale (2000) argue that professional asset managers
can use complex and sophisticated ¯nancial instruments to improve risk sharing beyond that of
simple diversi¯cation. Developing proxy variables for the risk sharing bene¯ts of intermediated
stock ownership is an avenue for future research. A problem for arguments based on risk sharing
is to explain why mutual funds that specialize in risk sharing are small before they become part
of the retirement system. Another challenge is to explain why the stock ownership structures of
high-tax countries and low-tax countries follow di®erent paths during the high-in°ation period of
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
We have seen in Table 1 that inter-corporate ownership in Sweden increases as e®ective tax rates
reach higher levels. Do ¯rms in Sweden, Germany, and Japan purchase stock portfolios to hedge
pension liabilities on the books? That is, to what extent can tax policy explain the prevalence
of inter-corporate ownership? The cross-country panel approach used in this paper may provide
a useful tool to study this and related tax questions that otherwise are restricted to studying the
e®ects of a handful major tax reforms.
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418 Appendix: Personal Taxation of Stocks
This appendix explains the principles of personal taxation of income from stocks in the United
States, Canada, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Sweden, and Finland. We do not cover
the taxation of corporate income except where it is needed to understand personal taxation of
dividends. The following general notation is used:
¿d = personal tax rate on dividend income.
¿r = reduction rate on dividend income.
¿i = imputation rate on dividend income.
¿g = personal tax rate on capital gains.
¿p = personal tax rate on ordinary income.
¿pi = personal tax rate on investment income.
¿pc = central personal tax rate.
¿ps = sub-central personal tax rate.
¿sc = central surtax rate on personal tax.
¿ss = sub-central surtax rate on personal tax.
The precise meaning of each tax rate is explained in its context below. Many tax systems are
covered and additional notation is introduced as needed. The statutory tax rates are not reported
here, but can be requested from the authors.
8.1 United States
Personal income is subject to federal, state, and city taxes. When there is a choice (since 1949), we
choose the federal tax tables for a married couple ¯ling jointly. We adjust for state tax by assuming
it is a time-series constant ¿ps = 5percent, but we ignore city tax. The assumption for the state
tax rate is based on the equally-weighted average top statutory state tax rates in 1950, 1987, and
2006. The information is taken from Sagoo (2005).
428.1.1 Dividends
From 1913{2002, dividends are taxed as ordinary income. State taxes are deductible at the federal
level, so the marginal tax rate on dividend income equals:
¿d = ¿pc(1 ¡ ¿ps) + ¿ps: (9)
In 2003, the United States switches to a dual-income system, where ordinary income and investment
income are taxed as separate income classes. The federal tax schedule on dividends is simpler, it
involves only two steps, and peaks well below the top personal rate:
¿d = ¿pi(1 ¡ ¿ps) + ¿ps: (10)
8.1.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1916. From 1916{1933, realized capital gains on stocks
are taxed as ordinary income. From 1922{1933, the capital gains tax rate is capped at 12.5 percent.
From 1934{1986, a portion ¼ of long-term capital gains is taxed:
¿g = ¼ £ [¿pc(1 ¡ ¿ps) + ¿ps]: (11)
The federal capital gains tax rate is capped at 30 percent (1938{1941) and 25 percent (1942{1969).
The cap is removed in 1972{1986. There is a Vietnam war capital gains surtax ¿gs in 1968{1970:
¿g = ¼ £ [¿pc(1 + ¿sc)(1 ¡ ¿ps) + ¿ps]: (12)
Since 1987, long-term capital gains are taxed as a separate income class:
¿g = ¿pi(1 ¡ ¿ps) + ¿ps: (13)
438.2 Canada
A distinguishing feature of the Canadian tax system is that provincial (sub-central) tax rates are
de¯ned as proportions of federal (central) taxes. Hence, central and sub-central tax rates are
multiplied with each other, which means that the provincial tax is a tax on the federal tax. We
approximate the provincial tax with the rates from Ontario. Our main data sources are Revenue
Canada (1950{2006), Perry (1989), and Perry (1990).
8.2.1 Dividends
We begin with the Canadian tax system in 1949{1971. A tax credit is provided at the central level
for sub-central taxes. Let ¿rs denote the sub-central reduction rate. The personal tax rate net of
the sub-central tax credit equals:
¿p = ¿pc + (¿ps ¡ ¿rs)¿pc: (14)
Dividends are taxed as personal income, but Canada o®ers a dividend-tax relief at rate ¿r. Dividend
income is taxed at the rate:
¿d = ¿pc ¡ ¿r (central tax)
+ (¿ps ¡ ¿rs) £ (¿pc ¡ ¿r) (sub-central tax)
(15)
This expression corrects Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) and Booth and Johnston (1984), who
include the sub-central tax credit, but fail to include the sub-central tax.
We proceed with the tax system in 1972{1999. There are two important changes. First, an
imputation-tax credit at rate ¿i replaces the dividend-reduction rate ¿r. The dividend tax and the
imputation-tax credit are levied on the grossed-up dividend 1 + g. Second, the sub-central tax
credit is abandoned and, later, surtaxes are added at both the central and the sub-central level.
44The surtaxes are de¯ned as proportions of other taxes. Dividend income is taxed at rate:
¿d = [(1 + g)¿pc ¡ (1 + g)¿i] (central tax)
+ [(1 + g)¿pc ¡ (1 + g)¿i] £ ¿sc (central surtax)
+ [(1 + g)¿pc ¡ (1 + g)¿i] £ ¿ps (sub-central tax)
+ [(1 + g)¿pc ¡ (1 + g)¿i] £ ¿ps £ ¿ss (sub-central surtax)
(16)
This expression can be simpli¯ed to:
¿d = (1 + g)(¿pc ¡ ¿i)[1 + ¿ps(1 + ¿ss) + ¿sc]: (17)
The personal tax rate is simpler as there is no imputation-tax credit:
¿p = ¿pc [1 + ¿ps(1 + ¿ss) + ¿sc]: (18)
Next, we explain the Canadian tax system as of 2000{2005. This tax reform changes the sub-
central tax. Instead of a tax on tax, the sub-central tax becomes a tax on income. Surtaxes remain
to be tax on tax. A new sub-central dividend credit at rate ¿rs is also introduced:
¿d = [(1 + g)¿pc ¡ (1 + g)¿i] (central tax)
+ [(1 + g)¿pc ¡ (1 + g)¿i] £ ¿sc (central surtax)
+ [(1 + g)¿ps ¡ (1 + g)¿rs] (sub-central tax)
+ [(1 + g)¿ps ¡ (1 + g)¿rs] £ ¿ss (sub-central surtax)
(19)
Essentially, the federal and provincial taxes are calculated separately and then summed together.
The expression simpli¯es to:
¿d = (1 + g)[(¿pc ¡ ¿i)(1 + ¿sc) + (¿ps ¡ ¿rs)(1 + ¿ss)]: (20)
45Again, the personal tax rate is simpler:
¿p = ¿pc(1 + ¿sc) + ¿ps(1 + ¿ss): (21)
Finally, there is a change in the taxation of dividends in 2006 that we ignore because stock ownership
data and GDP per capita are not yet available for 2006.
8.2.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1972. The principles have not changed as of 2006. A
proportion of long-term capital gains ¼ is taxed as ordinary income:
¿g = ¼ £ ¿p: (22)
From 1986{1989, households earn a lifetime capital gains exemption for the sale of all property
including real estate. Although the exemption amount is quite large, we ignore this provision.
8.3 United Kingdom
Income taxes are collected at the central level only, so we do not need to worry about sub-central
taxes. The main information and data sources are Orhnial and Foldes (1975), King (1977), and
the HM Revenue & Customs website.
8.3.1 Dividends
From 1947{1964, the United Kingdom has a tax system which can be characterized as a hybrid
of two business taxation models. One component conforms to the classical model of corporate
taxation with double taxation except that there are di®erent tax rates for distributed and retained
pro¯ts. Speci¯cally, the corporation pays corporate tax at rate ¿cd on distributed pro¯ts and rate
¿cr on retained pro¯ts, where ¿cd ¸ ¿cr. Shareholders in higher income brackets pay personal tax on
dividends at rate ¿p ¡ ¿pst, where ¿pst is the standard rate of income tax. The other component of
the hybrid system conforms to the standard model of partnership taxation, where business income
46passes through and is taxed as personal income. Speci¯cally, shareholders pay tax on corporate
income at the standard rate of income tax ¿pst irrespective of whether corporate income is paid out
or retained. This tax is paid in addition to personal tax on dividends.
In the hybrid system, the marginal tax rate on dividend income equals the personal rate. To
see this, we decompose pre-tax corporate income Y into after-tax dividend D, after-tax retained
earnings RET, paid corporate taxes on dividends, and paid corporate taxes on retained earnings:
Y = D + ¿cdD + RET + ¿crRET: (23)
From 1947{1951, an individual shareholder is liable for personal tax in the amount:
(¿p ¡ ¿pst)D + ¿pstD + ¿pstRET: (24)
The ¯rst term is personal income tax on dividends (¯rst component of the hybrid system). The
second and the third terms are personal tax on corporate income (second component). From this
expression, we can see that the marginal tax rate on dividend income equals:
¿d = (¿p ¡ ¿pst) + ¿pst = ¿p: (25)
From 1952{1964, the corporate tax deductability is removed and shareholders are also liable for
personal tax on paid corporate taxes:
(¿p ¡ ¿pst)D + ¿pstD + ¿pstRET + ¿pst(¿cdD + ¿crRET): (26)
We can see that the marginal tax rate on dividend income equals the marginal tax rate on personal
income as in (25).
In 1965{1972, the United Kingdom switches to a classical tax system. Dividends are taxed as
personal income at rate ¿d = ¿p. A few years later, in 1973{1998, the United Kingdom switches to
an imputation-tax system with a signi¯cant dividend-tax relief. The tax and the imputation-tax
credit is levied on the grossed-up dividend 1=(1¡¿i), so the marginal tax rate on dividend income
47equals:
¿d =
¿p ¡ ¿i
1 ¡ ¿i
: (27)
The imputation rate is de¯ned as the standard rate of income tax, which means that only households
in higher income brackets pay tax on dividends. From 1973{1984, dividend income above an
exclusion amount is subject to investment income surcharge at rate 15 percent on top of the
ordinary income tax rate for high-income earners. We ignore the surcharge in our calculations
because the exclusion amount is large.
Since 1999, the United Kingdom combines the imputation-tax system with a dual-income system
where dividends are taxed as a separate income class at a proportional rate below ordinary income:
¿d =
¿pi ¡ ¿i
1 ¡ ¿i
: (28)
8.3.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1965. From 1965{1987, the United Kingdom practices a
dual-income system where realized capital gains are subject to a proportional rate after an initial
exempt amount. From 1988{2006, realized capital gains are taxed as ordinary income except for
an initial exempt amount. From 1982{1997, the cost basis is indexed for in°ation. The gap plot
for the United Kingdom in Figure 8 is corrected for indexing.
8.3.3 Pensions
From 1973{1997, untaxed investors also earn a tax refund on dividends (see Bell and Jenkinson
(2002)). This means that equation (4) for the expected rate of return on a pension fund changes
to:
r ¼
µ
1 +
¿i
1 ¡ ¿i
¶
d + g; (29)
and equation (6) becomes:
GAP =
³
¿p
1¡¿i
´
d + ¿gg
1 + i
: (30)
488.4 Japan
Taxes are collected at the central level, but the revenues from speci¯c taxes are reserved for the
sub-central administration. The central tax is referred to as national tax and the sub-central taxes
as prefectural tax and municipal tax, respectively. From 1953{1961, municipalities are o®ered the
choice among three di®erent tax schedules. We focus on option b which becomes the standard from
1962. The main data sources are Ishi (2001) and Tax Bureau of Finance (1953{2005). We are
missing the tax tables from 1949{1952.
8.4.1 Dividends
Dividend income is taxed as personal income subject to central tax rate ¿pc and sub-central tax
rate ¿ps (prefectural and municipal tax). Both the central and the sub-central tax schedules are
progressive. From 1950{2006, Japan o®ers a dividend-tax credit in the form of a rate reduction.
The central reduction rate is ¿rc and the sub-central reduction rate ¿rs. The marginal tax rate on
dividend income equals:
¿d = ¿pc + ¿ps ¡ ¿rc ¡ ¿rs: (31)
The reduction rates are lower for higher dividend income (two income brackets). In our calculations,
we choose the reduction rate for the lower income level because the higher income tax bracket is
high (annual dividend income above JPY 10 million). The marginal tax rates on personal income
¿pc + ¿ps is capped from 1961{1988:
¿d = min[¿pc + ¿ps;¿cap] ¡ ¿rc ¡ ¿rs; (32)
i.e., the dividend-tax reduction is earned in full after the cap is imposed.
From 1965{2006, the marginal tax rate on dividends depends on the dividend amount earned
from each stock in the portfolio. Therefore, the marginal tax rate does not only depend on household
income but also on portfolio composition and dividend yield. The dividend is small, intermediate, or
large depending on whether the dividend on the stock falls below, between, or exceeds JPY 50,000
and 250,000, respectively. In 1973, the cuto®s are doubled. From 1965{1988, large dividends are
49taxed according to (31). This tax treatment referred to as Case I in Figure 7a and the text above.
For intermediate dividends, the shareholder can choose between personal taxation (31) and the
following simpli¯ed procedure:
¿d = ¿pi + ¿ps ¡ ¿rs: (33)
Under the option, a proportional investment tax ¿pi replaces the central tax schedule ¿pc and reduc-
tion ¿rc. The option is referred to as Case II above. Finally, for small dividends, the shareholder can
choose between personal taxation (31) and not reporting the dividend income on the tax return.
In the latter case, the shareholder ends up paying the proportional withholding tax collected at
source. This is referred to as Case III above.
8.4.2 Capital Gains
Before 1953, capital gains on stocks are taxed as ordinary income. From 1953{1988, stocks are
exempt from capital gains tax. Capital gains tax on stocks is reintroduced in 1989. For long-term
capital gains de¯ned by the minimum holding period of one year, shareholders are given a choice.
First, the investor can choose to not report the capital gain. In this case, the capital gains tax
equals the withholding tax of 1 percent of the sales price. Second, if the investor chooses to report
the capital gain on the tax return, it is subject to a proportional investment income tax (national
tax and local inhabitants tax). We ignore capital gains tax in our calculations.
8.5 Germany
Personal income is taxed at the central level only. We choose the tax schedule for a married
couple ¯ling jointly. From 1958{2006, there is only one tax schedule. Then, the tax for a married
couple equals two times the tax on half the income, so the marginal tax rate for a married couple
with income equal to GDP5 equals the marginal tax rate of a single ¯ler with income equal to
GDP2.5. The main data sources are BÄ orsch-Supan (1994), Corneo (2005), and the German Tax
Administration. We use the 1954 tax table for 1955 and 1956, which are missing.
508.5.1 Dividends
Dividends are taxed as personal income. A special feature of the German tax code since 1958 is
that the marginal tax rate is determined by a combination of a step function and a continuous
function. The marginal tax rate is a constant in the lowest and the highest income brackets, and
it is determined by a polynomial function in the intermediate income brackets:
¿p = a + 2b1
µ
Y ¡ c
d
¶1
¡ 3b2
µ
Y ¡ c
d
¶2
+ 4b3
µ
Y ¡ c
d
¶3
; (34)
where Y denotes taxable income and fa;b1;b2;b3;c;dg are parameters which vary over time. The
polynomial function has three terms in 1958{1974, four terms in 1975{1989 (as shown), and two
terms in 1990{2006 (linear function).
From 1977{2001, Germany has an imputation-tax system that works as in the United King-
dom (27). From 2002{2006, Germany switches to a partial-inclusion system, where a proportion ¼
of the dividend is taxable income:
¿d = ¼ £ ¿p: (35)
Following the uni¯cation of West and East Germany, personal income is also subject to a multi-
plicative surtax:
¿d =
8
> <
> :
³
¿p¡¿i
1¡¿i
´
(1 + ¿sc) , in 1990{2001;
¼¿p(1 + ¿sc) , in 2002{2006:
(36)
From 1950{2006, there is also a church tax which also enters like a multiplicative surtax. We
ignore this tax. The church tax is optional (one can opt out of the church), the e®ective tax rate
is relatively small in the order of 1{2 percent, and it varies geographically.
8.5.2 Capital Gains
Long-term capital gains de¯ned by a minimum holding period of six months before 1998 and 12
months from 1998 are exempt from capital gains tax.
518.6 France
Taxes are collected at the central level only. We ignore surtaxes in our calculations. The main data
sources are Fougµ ere (1994) and Piketty (2001).
8.6.1 Dividends
From 1950-1959, dividends are taxed at source at rate ¿w. The net dividend is taxed as personal
income:
¿d = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¿p)(1 ¡ ¿w): (37)
From 1960-1964, dividends are taxed as personal income. The withholding tax is fully deductible:
¿d = ¿p: (38)
From 1965-2004, France has a standard imputation-tax system that o®ers a partial credit for
corporate taxes on distributed pro¯ts as in (27). In 2005-2006, France replaces the imputation-tax
system with a partial-inclusion system where a proportion ¼ of the dividend is taxed as personal
income as in (35).
8.6.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1976. Capital gains are taxed as a separate income class
subject to a low proportional rate. A relatively large amount is exempt, so we assume that the
capital gains tax is e®ectively zero.
8.7 Sweden
Personal income is subject to national tax (central), municipal tax, and church tax (sub-central).
We use the average municipal tax rate, but we ignore the prefectural tax and the church tax, which
are relatively small. We also ignore a social security tax (Folkpensionsavgift, 1936-1973), which
is based on ordinary income including investment income. The social security tax is capped and
rather small at higher income levels. When there is a choice (1953{1970), we use the national tax
52rates for a married couple ¯ling jointly. The main data sources are SÄ oderberg (1996), Statistics
Sweden, and the Swedish Tax Administration.
8.7.1 Dividends
Dividends are taxed as personal income. Sub-central taxes are deductible before 1971 and not
deductible from 1971:
¿d =
8
> <
> :
¿pc(1 ¡ ¿ps) + ¿ps , in 1948{1970;
¿pc + ¿ps , in 1971{1990:
(39)
The combined marginal tax rate is capped in 1980{1985. In 1991, Sweden introduces a dual-income
system, where ordinary income is subject to a progressive schedule and dividend income is taxed
as investment income subject to a lower proportional rate:
¿d = ¿pi: (40)
8.7.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1910. From 1910{1951, short-term capital gains as de¯ned
by a holding period of less than ¯ve years are taxed as ordinary income, while long-term capital
gains are exempt. From 1952{1976, a portion ¼ of short-term capital gains is taxed as ordinary
income as in (22). The portion depends on the holding period:
¼ =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :
100% , if 0{2 years;
75% , if 2{3 years;
50% , if 3{4 years;
25% , if 4{5 years;
0% , if >5 years:
(41)
53From 1967{1976, 10 percent of the sales price of a security held more than ¯ve years is taxed as
ordinary income. From 1977{1989, the formula for the inclusion proportion changes to:
¼ =
8
> <
> :
100% , if 0{2 years;
40% , if >2 years:
(42)
In 1990, the proportion increases to ¼ = 50%. From 1991{2006, all capital gains are taxed as
investment income:
¿g = ¿pi: (43)
The tax rule in e®ect 1967{1976 removes the basis from the calculation of the long-term capital
gain. As above, let g denote nominal stock price growth rate. The statutory marginal tax rate on
long-term capital gains equals:
¿g = 10%¿p
Ã
(1 + g)N
(1 + g)N ¡ 1
!
: (44)
This expression shows that the e®ect on the marginal tax rate from the loss of the basis is small
over long investment horizons, especially when expected stock price growth is high. The value of
the basis protection disappears in the limit as N goes to in¯nity. In the analysis above, we assume
that N = 15, g = 2% + i, where i equals three-year moving average in°ation.
8.7.3 Pensions
From 1991{2006, imputed income from pension asset management de¯ned as the average treasury
rate during the previous year times the value of the pension assets in the beginning of the year
is taxed at the proportional rate 15 percent. We denote the expected treasury rate with rf and
measure it as 1 percent plus moving average in°ation. Equation (6) becomes:
GAP =
¿dd + ¿gg ¡ 15%rf
1 + i
: (45)
548.8 Finland
Income taxation in Finland resembles Sweden in many ways. Personal income is subject to national
tax (central), municipal tax, and church tax (sub-central). We approximate the sub-central tax
rate with the average municipal tax rate, but we ignore the relatively small church tax. We use the
national tax tables for a married couple ¯ling jointly with no dependents (1950{1975). The main
data sources are Kukkonen (2000) and the Finnish Tax Administration.
8.8.1 Dividends
From 1950{1992, dividends are taxed as ordinary income. The marginal tax rate on dividends
equals the sum of central and sub-central tax rates:
¿d = ¿pc + ¿ps: (46)
From 1993{2004, Finland uses a dual-income system with full imputation. Dividends are subject to
investment income tax at rate ¿pi and corporate tax is credited back through imputation as in the
United Kingdom (27). Most years, the investment income rate equals the imputation rate so that
¿d = 0. Recently, in 2005{2006, Finland replaces the imputation system with a partial-inclusion
system such that a proportion ¼ of the dividend is taxed as investment income:
¿d = ¼ £ ¿pi: (47)
8.8.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1920. From 1920{1985, short-term capital gains as de¯ned
by a holding period of less than ¯ve years are taxed as ordinary income, while long-term capital
gains are exempt. From 1986{1992, the rules change gradually towards the new system in place
since 1993. An initial (large) amount is tax exempt. A portion ¼ of the capital gain above the
tax-exempt amount is taxed as ordinary income as in (22). The portion depends on the holding
55period. From 1986{1988 it is:
¼ =
8
> <
> :
100% , if 0{5 years;
20% , if >5 years;
(48)
from 1989{1990:
¼ =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
100% , if 0{4 years;
80% , if 4{5 years;
40% , if >5 years;
(49)
and from 1991{1992:
¼ =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
100% , if 0{4 years;
80% , if 4{5 years;
50% , if >5 years:
(50)
From 1993{2006, all capital gains on stocks are taxed as investment income as in (43). Since 1986,
a long-term investor has the option to de¯ne the capital gain as 50 percent of the sales price from
1986{1992 and 30 percent from 1993{2006. In our calculations, we ignore this option and the initial
tax-exempt amount because the di®erence is small.
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